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.URBAN LAND LAW, DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ECONOMICALLY WEAKER SECTION IN INDIA.
Patrick McAuslan
On the 31st March 1983 the Supreme Court of India commenced hearing
appeals in two most important cases concerning the human rights and
living conditions of the economically weaker sections (EWS) of the
country. In the first case, the Bombay municipal authorities were
appealing against a judgment of the Bombay High Court which had held that
pavement dwellers had a right to dwell on their particular piece of the
pavement and their dwellings could not be demolished and they could not
be moved unless and until suitable alternative accommodation was made
available to them. In the second case, members of the EWS in Madras were
appealing against a decision of the Madras High Court which had held that
where the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board had provided temporary
alternative accommodation for slum-dwellers pending the completion of a
housing scheme, the Board was entitled to demolish that temporary
accommodation once the permanent accommodation was available for
occupation; the argument for the appellants being that a right to live
implied a right to a livelihood and once they moved to a new housing
estate away from the centre of the city, their livelihood would to a
large extent depend upon their being able to let the temporary
accommodation to other slum-dwellers.
It would be difficult to think of two more apt cases to raise a host
of issues relating to human rights and develooment in the Third World.
First and foremost, the question of the role of the courts may be
addressed. Approaching Indian legal matters for the first time after
more than two decades of work in and study of legal matters in various
African countries, one was very forcibly struck by the central role that
the courts play in, at least, the urban development process; whether in
regulating the manner of compulsory acquisition of the amount of
compensation, the exercise of powers by planning and building control
authorities or by public land development authorities or by policing the
implementation of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. Equally,
despite the standard complaints of the urban administration that the
courts are unsympathetic to their efforts to ameliorate the lot of the
EWS and over sympathetic to demands of landowners for maximum
compensation for the compulsory acquisition of their land, the cases
indicate a different story as the two cases described above suggest.
Generalisations are hazardous in respect of the hundreds of judicial
decisions in the broad area of urban administration and development in
India, but my impression after surveying cases from 1979 onwards is that
many courts have a lively appreciation of the housing needs of the EWS
and of the need to enforce planning and building codes, and are not
obstructive of correct, careful and lawful action by administrators; they
are on the other hand willing to strike down action which is the reverse
of that.
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Two excellent illustrations of this position come from a contrasting
pair of cases in the area of building controls. The first case is Ram
Awatar v. Calcutta Corporation AIR 1982 Cal. 315, the Calcutta High Court
decision in the unauthorised 14 storey building case recently confirmed
by the Supreme Court. In that case it was clear that the Corporation had
served all the relevant notices correctly; had made repeated attempts,
supported by the police, to stop the unauthorised building and arrest the
people engaged in the construction work; that all the tenants who moved
into the building (the whole of which was an unauthorised structure) did
so after a demolition order had been served and knowing full well that
the whole building had been erected in flagrant violation of the law.
The courts in other words supported the correct, vigorous and repeated
efforts of the administration to uphold the law.
Contrast with this Gupta v. Soecial Officer, Madras Municioal
Corporation (1980) (2) NU9=9. in this case officers of the Madras
Corporation had, as found by the High Court of Madras, managed to delay
granting a building permission for seven years and in doing so were
motivated by bias and personal animosity towards the petitioner because
they disapproved of the granting to him by the Special Officer of a lease
of the land on which he wished to build. Again the court found that the
officers of the Corporation were acting under powers of the Madras city
Municipal Corporation Act which set out specific grounds on which a
building permit could be refused yet were purporting to deny a permit on
town planning grounds contained in the Town and Country Planning Act.
This was something they could not do. The decision of the Corporation
was quashed.
The decision of the courts then are not necessarily obstructive.
Even in the area of compensation for compulsory acquisition which has
given rise to much constitutional anguish over the years1 the courts
are not noticeably and obviously out of step with the Constitution as
amended from time to time as opposed to politicians' and administrators'
wishes. Nor have they set about emasculating the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, passed in and for the States during the Emergency, an
act designed to limit Speculation and hoarding in urban land "with a view
to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban
agglomerations to subserve the common good" (pre-amble) although the
marked lack of enthusiasm with which the Act is being implemented in some
States may account for this; relatively few cases on the Act have been
reported so far.
It is not the decisions but the use of the courts, which raises more
issues from our perspective. Given the inordinate delay in the legal
system, a challenge to an administrative decision can delay action for up
to three years, sometimes longer. Several challenges on 'different
aspects of a housing agency's operation may effectively bring the total
operation of the agency to a halt. Equally, a request, usually granted,
for a temporary stay of execution of e.g. an order to desist erecting a
building alleged to be in contravention of the planning or building
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regulations allows a developer to continue to erect the building; it is
much more difficult to justify pulling down a completed building than
preventing the erection of it in the first place though as Ram Awatar's
Case shows the courts are not rigid on the matter. Thus the legal system
at one and the same time appears to facilitate the private developer's
anti-social activities yet hinder the public developer's social
activities. Does this not place human rights as seen by the courts - the
right to private property, the right to a fair hearing - in opposition to
development as seen by most liberal and social democratic commentators -
providing a better life for the EWS?
Put in that way, the contrast seems stark and the conflict
unavoidable. But is that the way to regard the problem? As the Bomoay
case shows, some courts are quite willing to extend the right to property
to the slums of the EWS in order to protect them and give them a
bargaining position against an impersonal bureaucracy. A right to a fair
hearing is likely to be exploited by those with the wealth to hire
lawyers, but the absence of the possibility of using the courts to
challenge the decisions of administrators rarely redounds to the benefit
of the EWS while the wealthy and the elite will always find ways of
overcoming or side-stepping inconvenient administrative decisions.
Another point is worth making. Too often discussions of judicial
control of administrative action in the Third World take the form of
discussions of judicial control versus administrative action - I have
beern guilty of that approach myself - and certainly in some countries in
Africa, Colonial judicial quietism did seem to be replaced, on occasions,
with judicial activism after independence which gave rise to an
appearance of judges - often expatriate - against governments. But, as
has been pointed out earlier with reference to the two cases on building
regulations, courts are usually concerned to stop illegal administrative
action and the remedy lies in the hands of administrators. Equally it is
not impossible to build into administrative programmes allowances for
delays brought about by use or even misuse of the legal system. Since I
was in Tamil Nadu State in an official capacity as a consultant to the
Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, it would be inappropriate for
me to name names, but in talking to officials from different agencies
concerned with land use development and controls, I was struck oy the
very different attitudes taken towards the use of and decisions by the
courts. On the one hand, one found some officials who had virtually
thrown in the towel - 'nothing could be done, the courts blocked
everything, only in the Emergency did things get done' -; on the other
hand, one found officials who were full of vigour, willing to press on,
regarding the activities of the courts with a certain amount of
resignation but not letting them stop implementation of programmes; they
were something one had to live with and adjust to. This latter attitude
is surely the appropriate one to adopt.
The role of the courts in upholding traditional human rights does not
then necessarily pit them against any new rights to develop. Indeed the
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influential ILO publication of 1977 --The Basic Needs Approach to
Development - stated that:
"...The satisfaction of an absolute level of basic
needs ... should be placed within a broader
framework - namely the fulfilment of basic human
rights which are not only ends in themselves but
also contribute to the attainment of other goals."
Having said that, however, it is also necessary to recognize the courts
are not and never have been neutral computer-like interpreters of human
rights or law establishing programmes of positive public developments.
Courts have policies - this has long been accepted in the USA amongst
both practitioners and commentators and in the U.K. increasingly amonst
commentators even if some people still prefer to avert their gaze from
the obvious - and at least in the common law world still over-reliant on
English precedents, these policies when applied to programmes of public
and collectively organised action e.g. public housing, public transport,
rates, have a tendency to cause courts to see issues too readily in terms
of an individual and his/her property rights versus the public
bureaucracy which is organising the collective consumption of a public
good, instead of seeing the issue in terms of the rights of many
individuals versus the rights of a few or one.- Judicial policies of
individualism may well need to be rethought in the context of a right to
develop, but here too, my admittedly rather superficial survey of Indian
cases suggested that there was an awareness of the existence of an
alternative philosophy to that of an individualism based au fond, on
property rights.
It would seem to me to be impossible to draft legislation creating a
right to develop or requiring development issues to be taken into account
when considering questions of human rights and spelling out the basic
philosophy which should guide both courts and administrators when making
decisions. Directive Principles of State Policy already exist in some
Commonwealth constitutions and these could be built on. Admittedly,
where governments are not prepared to accept any controls on any of their
actions whatsoever, a discussion of how to draft legislation protecting
and advancing new types of rights is somewhat otiose but the assumption
behind this paper and indeed, it is assumed, this conference, is that we
are discussing ways and means in which law, lawyers and legal
institutions can be used to encourage governments to be more responsive
to their peoples' needs for development, in the context of human rights
and vice versa, so that the focus is likely to be on courts, drafting and
the like.
One important matter has been assumed throughout the discussion so
far. This is that individuals will be able to take action against
government agencies. This is assumed without question in India and it
could be argued that it was this unspoken and w dely accepted belief that
individualshave rights and these rights should be protected, however
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imperfectly in practice this is accomplished, that ensured that the
Emergency in India would in the end.be overturned, not by a coup but by
elections. Apart from Nigeria, it would be fair to say that few
countries in Commonwealth Africa accept both in theory and practice
individual challenges to exercises of state power; can anyone envisage a
challenge in the courts or even to the Permanent Commission of Inquiry in
respect of Tanzania's 'crackdown' on economic saboteurs, and in
neighbouring Kenya, the government and the courts paid scant regard to
individuals' human rights in the aftermath of the attempted coup of
August, 1982. The alternative to an individual in his/her own right or
groups of individuals or a representative individual acting on behalf of
a group activating human rights machinery is state agencies set up to
protect and advance human rights. Can such agencies successfully
substitute for an individual complainant? The experience of the
Commission for Racial Equality in the U.K. does not suggest that state
agencies are likely to be very effective in a hostile political
environment, especially when they are dependent for their funds on a less
than enthusiastic government. American experience is similar. I doubt
very much whether the slum-dwellers in Bombay and Madras would have got
as far as they have done if the highly traditional process of litigation
had not been available to them; that is that there were lawyers willing
to take their cases and a political climate of tolerance that such cases
could be litigated. A concern with a right to develop or to marry up
development with human rights will almost certainly involve allowing or
facilitating individuals to question or challenge governments or
participation in the planning and execution of projects to a greater
extent than most governments are -prepared to concede.
This paper may be thought excessively court orientated, based as it
is, loosely, on decisions in Indian courts. Reference to participation
can serve to remind us that there are other avenues by which human rights
can be taken into account in programmes of development. The programmes
of slum-clearance challenged in Bombay and Madras were typical top-down
programmes, conceived and executed by state agencies funded with state,
national and international funds, following bureaucratic procedures and
processes. The relevant Tamil Nadu legislation had no provision in it
for consultation with the intended beneficiaries of slum-clearance or for
taking account of their preferences in any rehousing programmes; the
legislation in fact following fairly closely the relevant parts of the
English Housing Act 1957 as unamended though with less provision for
inquiries. it could oe argued that had a process of preaction
participation oeen followed, the EWS who finally resorted to the courts
might not have done so because there would have been no need to;
differences of opinion and perceptions would have been ironed out
beforehand. From the perspective of development, one could argue that
traditional rights of free expression or free speech should be
interpreted to include a right to express an opinion on a programme of
development which is likely to affect one, and a correlative duty on
government to take account of such opinions and construct administrative
procedures to facilitate the expression of such opinions. In tnis
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respect there are few countries which measure up to the required
standards, too many making the mistake of assuming that a member of the
EWS, because he/she is poor, ill-educated, badly dressed, has nothing to
contribute to discussions on development.
Finally, and briefly, the two cases outlined at the beginning of the
-paper raise important and difficult substantive questions. What are the
answers? Will development in the interests of the EWS be hastened or
retarded by the Supreme Court's finding against the Bombay authorities?
Can the courts fashion a remedy which will compel the authorities to
build alternative accommodation and provide a livelihood for the EWS
rather than just cause programmes of slum-clearance altogether? Might
there not be on the statute book in each state more draconian legislation
which gives even fewer rights to the EWS than the legislation under
challenge to which resort could quite legally be had - if these
challenges succeed? There certainly is in Tamil Nadu State: the T.N.
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of ... Slum-grabbers Act 1982 which
provides for the preventive detention for up to 12 months of, inter alia,
slum-grabbers; persons who act as leaders in organised squatting. If the
right to life includes the right to a livelihood, should that secondary
right embrace the exploitation of the poor by the poor? To what extent
should courts substitute their own views on the proper balance between
different facets of any particular programme of development for the views
of administrators and elected politicians, and what kinds of information
and evidence should be placed before the courts to enable them to make
informed decisions on these matters? I cannot pretend to have the
definitive answers to these questions but they do seem to me to be the
kind of questions, alongside those that have been discussed in this
paper, which must be faced up to in any discussions of the inter-relation
of human rights and development, if those discussions are to inform and
assist practitioners of development, be they administrators, lawyers,
consultants or the subjects of development - the EWS.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See H. Merillat, Land and the Constitution in India (1970), for a
good discussion of the first two decades of the matter.
2. This is particularly so in England as to which see my "Administrative
Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy", (1983), 46 M.L.R. 1.
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